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THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY.

Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1967.

By Rita James Simon.

Pp. xiv, 269. $10.00.

Mrs. Simon has written an extremely provocative study which
marks the beginning of a worthwhile experiment. She describes her text
as a "Social psychological study of a legal institution: the American
jury system.., involving the defense of insanity."
Mrs. Simon obtained the transcripts of two actual cases that had
been tried and decided. The transcripts were then edited and condensed
from a trial that lasted two or three days to one that could be heard in
sixty to ninety minutes. The experimental trials were then tape recorded.
The two cases presented two distinct factual situations, one involving a charge of housebreaking and the other a charge of incest.
Juries were selected with the cooperation of presiding judges from
three jurisdictions: Chicago, St. Louis and Minneapolis. Their services
were not voluntary; it was part of their regular period of jury duty. The
jurors listened to the recorded version of the trial. Each jury was then
asked to deliberate and reach a verdict.
The deliberations of the respective juries-thirty juries were used
in the housebreaking case and sixty-eight in the incest case-were
analyzed with respect to the impact of the jury's response to legal rules
defining insanity and the jury's assessment of the psychiatric testimony.
A study was also made on the influence of social status and attitudes of
the individual jurors as affecting their results.
Mrs. Simon is quick to acknowledge that the experimental technique
and design employed in this study are subject to some readily apparent
criticisms. One obvious criticism is that the verdicts of her experimental
juries cannot be regarded as valid, since the jurors were not deciding the
fate of a defendant but were merely playing a game. This is met by the
response that the recordings of the deliberations of the respective juries
demonstrate that the juries accepted their responsibility seriously and
rendered their verdict in the same fashion as if they were deliberating an
actual case. While the appendix, which records the deliberation of a
specific jury, demonstrates that the discussion was lively and spirited, one
cannot completely accept the author's contention that the experimental
nature of the case made no significant difference.
Most trial lawyers would agree that the most adamant juror in a
criminal case is the one who espouses a "not guilty" verdict. The
experimental juror who favors a not guilty verdict and who is in a distnict minority is much more inclined to yield to the persuasion of the
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majority, since acquiescence to that majority will not result in the actiral
conviction of a real defendant.
Perhaps the most significant objection to the validity of the results
of the study lies in the fact that the experimental jurors listened to a taped
recording of the trial which lasted only sixty to ninety minutes. This
method deprived the jurors of the opportunity to assess or evaluate the
testimony of a witness by observing the demeanor of that witness.
Judges and lawyers have long agreed that in many instances the appearance and demeanor of a witness can be pivotal in the outcome of any
given case. This is not merely a part of the trial folklore. Post-trial
discussions with jurors, not only in this writer's experience but the
experience of innumerable other trial lawyers, demonstrate that the
demeanor and appearance of a witness on the stand play a significant
role as to the weight the jury attaches to the testimony of that witness.
Condensation of the experimental trial, reducing a two or three day
trial into a sixty or ninety minute tape, is also unrealistic. The editing
of the original transcripts consisted primarily of deleting repetitious
testimony; that is, if more than one witness was incorporated in the
recording. Tedium and boredom in the trial of any lawsuit is the rule
rather than the exception. The drama, if any, in the trial of a lawsuit is
usually confined to the testimony of one or two pivotal witnesses and in
the summation of counsel. By capsuling two or three days of testimony
into sixty or ninety minutes, the impact of the boredom experienced by the
jurors is no longer a factor.
The two factual situations involving the defense of insanity which
were presented to the experimental jurors represent a poor choice. The
defense of insanity is most often raised in homicide cases. It is indeed
peculiar that this did not occur to the author. Assuming that the
experimental jurors could project themselves into the same mood and
temperament as if they were deciding the fate of an actual defendant, and
assuming that the capsuled recorded version of the trial would not
significantly affect their deliberations, the choice of defendants, a thief
and sexual pervert asserting the defense of insanity, is not representative.
In the case of the thief, the experimental jurors' deliberations must
necessarily be clouded by the ordinariness of the criminal act. In the case
of the sexual pervert, the experimental jurors must necessarily be
appalled by the atrocity of the criminal act. Had the author selected a
factual situation in which the criminal act was murder, the results would
not only have been more significant, but would have had more validity.
Nevertheless, the study was worthwhile and the conclusions reached
cannot be ignored.
One of the procedures employed in the study was to instruct one
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experimental jury under the McNaghten rule' another experimental
jury under the Durham rule2 and to give no instruction to a third. In
the latter version the jury was merely told "if you believe the defendant
was insane at the time he committed the act of which he is accused, then
you must find the defendant not guilty by reason of insanity."
In the housebreaking case, ten experimental juries were instructed
under the McNaghten rule, ten under the Durham rule, and ten uninstructed. The McNaghten juries were the most favorable to the defendant,
voting seven acquittals and one deadlock. The uninstructed juries voted
six not guilties, one hung jury. To everyone's surprise, including Mrs.
Simon, the Durham juries were more unfavorable to the defendant,
voting four acquittals, three convictions, with three juries deadlocked.
The McNaghten rule, as every law student knows, defines legal
insanity as:
Whether on the whole of the evidence you are satisfied at the
time the act was committed that the defendant had that competent use of his understanding as that he knew that he was
doing by the act itself a wicked and a wrong thing . . . if on
balancing the evidence in your minds you think the defendant
capable of distinguishing between right and wrong then he was
a responsible agent and liable to all the penalties the law imposes . . .'
The Durham rule, which was generally regarded by bench and bar
as a significant advance in expanding and modernizing the concept of
legal insanity, is defined as:
If you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was
not suffering from a diseased or defective mental condition
at the time he committed the criminal act charged you may
find him guilty. If you believe he was suffering from a diseased
or defective mental condition when he committed the criminal
act but believe beyond a reasonable doubt that the act was not
the product of such mental abnormality you may find of such
mental abnormality you may find him guilty. Unless you believe
beyond a reasonable doubt either that he was not suffering
from a diseased or defective mental condition or that the act
was not the product fo such abnormality you must find the
accused not guilty by reason of insanity . . . he would still be
1. McNaughten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (H.L. 1843).
2. Durham v. U.S., 214 F.2d 862.
3. Queen v. McNaughten, 4 Rep. State Trials (n.s.) 925 (1839).
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responsible for his unlawful act if there was no causal connection between such mental abnormality nad the act.'
Thus the Durham juries, who had the benefit of the so-called
enlightened rule on legal insanity, returned the most convictions and
demonstrated the most confusion. The author attributes this "lack of
clarity" to the smallness of the sample.
The surprising results in the housebreaking case, this writer submits, are primarily attributable to the factual situation involved. One
does not ordinarily associate insanity with thievery. The comparative results of the experimental juries in the incest case are much more meaningful.
Of the total of sixty-eight experimental juries used in the incest
case, twenty-two were uninstructed, twenty were instructed under the
McNaghten rule and twenty-six under the Durham rule. The McNaghten
juries deadlocked once and voted ninteen convictions. The uninstructed
juries voted four acquittals, fourteen findings of guility, with four hung
juries. The Durham juries voted five not guilty, fifteen guilty, with six
hung juries.
The findings in this portion of the study demonstrate that under the
McNaghten rule jurors are less likely to acquit the defendant on grounds
of insanity than they are under the Durham rule. One may, however,
question the validity of these findings. The McNaghten jury faced with
the problem of a sexual pervert experienced little difficulty in finding
that the defendant did know right from wrong-this is understandable.
The loathsomeness of the criminal act in the incest case had to be a
decisive factor in the deliberation of the McNaghten juries. All of us
know that incest is wrong; therefore, under the right or wrong test, it
would have been, as a practical matter, mandatory for the defendant to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not know right from wrong.
There would necessarily have been a subconscious shifting of the burden
of proof. The McNaghten juries would, therefore, tend not to require
the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
knew right from wrong, but to require the defendant to prove at least by
a preponderance of the evidence that he did not know right from wrong.
The wide divergence between the results of the McNaghten juries
and the Durham juries may not have been manifest had the subject
matter of the alleged crime been homicide rather than incest. One would
hope that further studies in this area would be made in that direction.
Judges and trial lawyers will find some comfort in the analysis of
the verdicts as to the social status of the jurors. The breakdown affirms
4.

214 F.2d at
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to a large extent the belief that jurors with advanced educations are
unfavorable to a defendant, lower income groups are more likely to favor
the defendant, housewives are generally more sympathetic to the defendant, and Negros are more willing to acquite the defendant than are jurors
in all other ethnic categories.
If there is one salient feature that this book demonstrates it is the
confusion, lack of predictability and archaicness of medico-legal concepts
of insanity. The law is continually searching for fixed and objective
standards in an area where the practioners of the art, the psychiatrists
themselves, frequently find their positions poles apart.
It is quite common in the trial of criminal cases in which a defense
of insanity is interposed to have not one but several confilcting opinions
of so-called medical experts as to the sanity of the defendant involved.
Until our brothers in the medical profession provide us with more
meaningful and comprehensible standards of what constitutes insanity,
we will continue to have this diffuse area of confusion and uncertainty.
The Durham rule is a step forward; it is by no means the ultimate solution.
MAX COHEN*
* Member of the Indiana Bar.
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